

Primary Sources

"The Battle For Iran." N.d. TS, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435. George Washington University.

The National Security Archive. George Washington University, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2014. This recently declassified internal CIA report summarizes Operation AJAX's process, and confirms in an appendix that most of the documentation covering the coup was destroyed. Interestingly, it states that much of the public's knowledge of the event around the time period was wildly inaccurate. Additionally, it shows that the CIA was extremely naive in "the aftermath of victory," neglecting to follow the Shah's government closely or the oppressive regime that he began with the creation of SAVAK.

Baraheni, Reza. "دانلود فيلم." دانلود فيلم. Amnesty Intl. N.p., 28 Oct. 1976. Web. 04 Jan. 2015.

This source, which is written in Arabic, was useful in determining how Iran was during the brutal rule under the shah. This source was a direct writing from Reza Baraheni, an Iranian historian during 1976, when the turmoil was rising and actions were coming to a head. This source talks about how low the public opinion was of the Iranian secret police, the SAVAK. Specifically, it details how SAVAK would randomly take citizens from their house and would torture them even if they simply lived next to a possible Shah protester, in a grotesque description of the brutality allowed under the Shah's regime.

British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ed. "British-American Planning Talks, Washington, October 10-11, 1978." (n.d.): n. pag.

The National Security Archive (George Washington University). George Washington University. Web. 13 Oct. 2014. This document is a set of notes from a meeting of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1978, as they discuss the state of foreign affairs with American officials. In the section pertaining to Iran, the note taker outlines a point that Henry Precht, British Country Director for Iran, makes, where he calls the mess in Iran "the worst foreign policy disaster to hit the West for many years." Precht goes on to correctly predict the fall of the Shah's government within a year, and the uprising of Khomeini. All in attendance agreed that however bad relations with Iran got, they could not be terminated because of Iranian dependence on the West buying oil. This shows that while both Americans and British officials understood the situation was rather dire as a result of the Coup, and they realized they had made a mistake, they did not fully appreciate the legacy that they could be leaving, and the full extent of their mistakes, as

they did not account for the anti-western sentiment felt in Iran at the time of Khomeini's rise to power.

Broe, William V. *Memorandum For the Record: Genesis of Operation FUBELT*. Rep. *National Security Archive*. George Washington University. Web. 8 Feb. 2015

This memorandum was one of the first documents from the planning process of operation FUBELT, which is better known as the Chilean coup. The memorandum outlines with urgency the need for a Chilean leader other than Salvador Allende, who posed a Communist threat to the country, and threatened the policy of containment. The memorandum was taken from the National Security Archive, sponsored by George Washington University, making it a very reliable primary document. It was very beneficial to our legacy argument in that it outlined an aspect of American foreign policy during the cold war, and was a very good example of the United States overthrowing a democratically elected leader, and replacing the leader with someone else in a coup.

Bruce, David K., and Robert A. Lovett. Bruce-Lovett Report. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1956. Print.

This report commissioned by the Board of Consultants on Federal Intelligence Activities highlights the shortfalls of the CIA organizational system, which it describes as free-wheeling and unchecked by qualified authorities, both internally and externally. Authors David K.E. Bruce and Robert A. Lovett (the Secretary of Defense) were highly critical of the free nature of the CIA, stating that it contained none of the long range guidance and visions necessary to ensure effective policy procedure (PP) operations. They provide few specific details to support their claims, using mostly broad generalizations about CIA workers or leaders, although the authoritative nature of the report and its writers leads us to believe that they have some weight behind their claims.

Campaign to Install a Pro-Western Government in Iran. N.d. CIA, Summary.

This report released in 2011 with the CIA Freedom of Information Act, likely prepared by Donald Wilbur, an architect of the coup, details the United States's point of view and thought process regarding the events and their actions in Iran. Although likely biased, it provides an elucidating perspective of the coup, first presenting knowledge of the Tudeh party's and Soviet Union's influence and recognizing the existence of Fedayen Islam. It claims that the US saw itself as an "honest broker," and that it was "admittedly reluctant" to take covert action in Iran, but that the coup was a "more desirable risk" than letting the Soviets gain an advantage in the region. It may be important to note that the document

was heavily excised, presenting the possibility that the CIA is withholding yet more important information.

Coyne, J. Patrick. Coyne Report to the CIA. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1956. Print.

This report on the status of CIA operations systems provided a comprehensive summary of the issues within the CIA organizational system. Primarily, a lack of proper checks and balances on CIA operations allowed it to pursue multiple potentially disastrous undertakings, without any of the long-range guidance and planning that should be provided by the State and Defense Departments. Overall, this source underscored the downfalls of the CIA at the time, and gave some suggestions on how to improve the accountability of the organization.

Daniel, Clifton. "U.S. and Britain Confronted By Dilemma on Help to Iran." The New York Times 11 Aug. 1952: n. pag. Print.

This primary source news article, published in the New York Times about a year before the coup, discusses the dilemma of the American and British governments in deciding whether or not to act in Iran. The primary British motivation in Iran was to combat Mossadeq's nationalization of the AIOC. The British insisted upon meeting with the United States first in order to get them to agree to assist. Of particular interest in this article is the fact the United States' State Department was mentioned as the driving force behind the American decision to instigate the coup due to the belief of a communist threat by the Tudeh Party. The head of the State Department, of course, was none other than John Foster Dulles. This article provides an interesting look at how the British were able to drag the United States along with them to help them in the coup, and how misinformed the United States were. It also reflects the misguided and misinformed leadership of John Foster Dulles and the resulting legacy of that.

Donovan, William. The Basis for a Permanent United States Foreign Intelligence Service. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1944. Print.

This primary source document is a proposal from General William Donovan to President Roosevelt about forming what would become the Central Intelligence Agency. This source is significant because it states the original purpose of the CIA. Donovan wanted to form an organization "which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies." Under this plan, a powerful, centralized intelligence agency would coordinate all

intelligence services. This source was very important in providing context and learning about the roots of the CIA. Understanding its origins allows us to better analyze and understand its development and in turn the Dulles brothers' influence.

Doolittle, James H., William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William D. Pawley. *The Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency*. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1954. Print.

This primary source report, only recently declassified due to the Freedom of Information Act, was absolutely vital in our research and forming our argument. The report, conducted by Lt. General James H. Doolittle with the assistance of other military officers and experts from other government organizations, was made per request of President Eisenhower. The report is a "comprehensive study of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency." The reason why this source is so valuable is not only that it is such a detailed investigation into the CIA's inner workings, but that it occurred right after two successful CIA-driven coups in Iran and Guatemala, making it especially pertinent to our research. Of particular interest in the report is the emphasis Doolittle puts on the need for improvement in the CIA in terms of communication and interdepartmental coordination. It also called for the reorganization of the CIA's structure, and noted certain security lapses. Given the extremely secretive nature of the CIA and the extreme lack of available primary sources about the organization during the time of the brothers, this source is by far one of the most valuable that we have uncovered. It strongly supports our argument regarding the problems in leadership on the American side of the coup stemming from government bureaucracy.

Dulles, Allen. "Allen Dulles Interview." Interview. *YouTube*. Google, 20 Feb. 2010. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

This 1966 interview of Allen Dulles provides a good look at Dulles's personal covering up of the coup. When the interviewer describes the amount of documents still classified by the CIA about the Coup, Dulles claims "I think everything that is vital as far as forming a judgement as to what really happened has been made available." This is a blatant lie, and the interviewer continues to voice his skepticism, only to be met by Dulles unyielding and charismatic defense. This source was a fair demonstration of both the lack of leadership of the coup because it showed the CIA's adamant denial that they messed up, and partially the legacy too because they were unwilling to come out with the truth and try to fix their mistakes.

Dulles, Allen. "Correspondence." Letter to Donald Wilbur. 30 Jan. 1954. Mossadegh Project.

N.p., 22 June 2014. Web. 22 Nov. 2014.

In an internal CIA letter/memorandum, Allen Dulles congratulates Donald Wilbur for his work on the 1953 Iranian coup. This letter helped us understand the relationship between the British and American sides of the coup that Wilbur mediated, which was generally tactful and professional without copious communication. Also, he once again expresses his somewhat ignorant opinion of the coup's success, without any thought for the long term consequences of an oppressive and authoritarian regime in Iran, even if it supported the West.

Dulles, Allen. "Allen W. Dulles Oral History Interview." Interview by Thomas Braden. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Dec. 2014.

This interview of Allen Dulles in 1964 covers the planning for, execution, and aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion led by the CIA during Dulles's tenure as Director. Dulles explains that he made a mistake in allowing President Kennedy to become so involved in the crisis. He believes, despite the disaster that occurred, that the operation had had some hope for success, and that it was mainly poor luck and execution that led to the partial failure of the operation. This source helped us understand Dulles's opinions on how CIA operations should be run and led, without interference from outside government agencies.

Dulles, Allen. *Germany's Underground*. New York: Macmillan, 1947. Print.

This book, which was written by Allen Dulles, goes in depth into how the OSS was created, and how that affected the events in World War II. Within this book, Dulles' judgmental attitude is apparent to all the leaders he disagreed with. He talked about how the United States should've gotten into the war as early as possible. From this book, we can see how his thoughts about radical action affected his leadership in the coup. It is a very helpful primary source, in that it provides deep insight into Dulles's perspective on his own leadership. Combining it with other sources, one can draw conclusions about his overconfidence, and how John Foster Dulles was overconfident as well. It was very beneficial to the leadership argument.

Dulles, Allen. *The Invisible War*. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 2007. Harvey Mudd Library. Web. 14 Dec. 2014.

This undated OSS report issued by Allen Dulles explains the standoff between the United States and the recently in power Communists in Russia. He spends a significant amount of time detailing the American public opinion of the Communist advance, though he

believes that people should be more wary of the threat. He admits that nobody has any accurate information on the Soviets, showing that most of the hyperbolic claims he continues to make are unfounded. Overall, it shows the inaccurate preconceptions that Dulles formed even before he was fully informed of the Communist situation around the globe, and therefore is very helpful for the leadership argument of impulsive foreign policy.

Dulles, Allen W. "THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GERMANY." Council on Foreign Relations. 3 Dec. 1945. Foreign Affairs. Web. 4 Jan. 2015.

This is an off the record speech which Allen Dulles made that was recently released to the public. Although it is about Germany in 1945, it provides insight into Dulles's leadership abilities. He often describes the situation as impossible and makes broad generalizations about the populations involved, supporting the idea that Dulles was generally pessimistic in the short term, and that he was prone to romanticize the situation in his mind to match with his self-image as a Christian American crusader out to help the people of the world against all evils.

Dulles, Allen. Soviet Economic Influences. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1958. 05 Dec. 2007. Web. 6 Jan. 2015.

This report written by Allen Dulles for the CIA outlines Soviet economic activities around the globe, focusing mainly on "third world" countries, including Iran (although by this point Iran was already under US control). Dulles expresses concerns of the power of Soviet propaganda throughout the globe, specifically in Egypt and Iran, demonstrating his fear of the Soviets in the Middle East. Most importantly, though, he highlights the extent of Soviet trade in the Middle East, which he believed to be an indicator of Soviet expansionary tendencies. This helped reveal that while Dulles was an idealistic leader, set in his ways, he was still brilliant, and had sufficient knowledge of the sentiments in Iran after the coup.

Dulles, John F. "Interview with John Foster Dulles." Interview by Hull. American History. Ashland University, 2006. Web. 15 Dec. 2014.

In an interview with the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, John Foster Dulles explains his view on the policy of containment. He says that a more dynamic and proactive "positive" policy is necessary to counter the Soviets, and in order to free the captive peoples under Soviet control. He states that a defensive policy will inevitably fail and be pushed back by an aggressive policy, so the Americans should assume a more

aggressive standpoint. Overall, he believes that the moral superiority of the United States can overcome the Soviet "evil" as long as they do not take on a negative defeatist attitude as they had been, which would require a more active foreign policy concerning the Cold War.

Dulles, John F. "John Foster Dulles Interview: U.S. Secretary of State under President Dwight D. Eisenhower." Interview by William B. Huie and Henry S. Hazlitt. Longines Chronoscope. 1952. Television.

This televised interview of John Foster Dulles himself provided an uncensored perspective of Foster Dulles's views on the Cold War. As he explained himself, he believed that the United States needed to become more vigorous and regain American "dynamism" in order to fight Soviet Russia in defense of American and human rights around the world. He also states that more open trade and economic policies in the First and Third worlds were key to holding back the Russians offensives around the globe. Dulles also states that he does not accept the "communization of the Chinese mainland." In addition to showing the fear Dulles had of Communism in the world, the interview is also indicative of how Dulles affected United States foreign policy. The viewpoints he shares in the interview are that of an anti-communist ideology as opposed to a pro-democracy policy. This is extremely relevant to our argument that Dulles' leadership left the legacy of a fundamental change in the goals of United States foreign policy.

Dulles, John F. "John Foster Dulles on Massive Retaliation." John Burroughs History. Web. 15 Dec. 2014.

This statement made by John Foster Dulles summarizes his perspective on American foreign policy concerning the Soviet threat on a global scale. As he puts it, the Americans could not afford to allow the Soviets to come to them, or else they would be forced to use "massive retaliation" measures - all-out or nuclear war - in order to simply hold back the Soviets. The Soviets, knowing this, would then be secure in their ability to dominate the United States. Instead, he says, the American community had to be proactive and become the aggressor itself, so that the Soviets would not have the chance to attack on its own terms. A very helpful leadership source, it provided the insight on Foster Dulles's ideas, which went hand in hand with his brother's.

"Eisenhower Doctrine (1957)." World History: The Modern Era. ABC-CLIO, 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2014.

This primary source, commonly known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, is a famous speech

that defines the American foreign policy of that era. In the speech, Eisenhower declared that Middle Eastern states could request American aid if they felt threatened by another foreign power. Eisenhower specifically points out the threat of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. This source is extremely relevant because what Eisenhower is saying perfectly reflects the fundamental influence that the Dulles brothers' leadership had on American foreign policy. Eisenhower even goes so far as to mention John Foster and his views on foreign policy. As such, this source is clearly indicative of the legacy in foreign policy of the Dulles brothers' leadership.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963. Print.

This primary source spans exactly the time period we are interested in. It gives copies of Eisenhower's correspondence with Iranian leaders and also gives his thoughts on their nations' relationships. Specifically, he believed that Iran and the United States were highly dependent on each other, mainly due to the trade relationship they held with Iranian oil being used in a American and American military support in Iran. However, he does not mention specifically the covert actions the CIA had planned for Iran and Mossadeq, which were only later unveiled in 2012. It helps with the legacy in Iran argument, showing how the situation was handled in the country after Mossadeq was overthrown.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "President Eisenhower's Final Reply to Premier Mossadegh." Letter to Mohammed Mossadeq. 29 June 1953. The Mossadegh Project. Mohammed Mossadegh, n.d. Web. 4 Jan. 2015.

Nearly a month after receiving Mossadeq's plea for domestic help in Iran, Eisenhower's reply is frankly curt. He puts the blame on Iran's inability to work with the British instead of proposing ways in which the United States could help. This is because he had already given the Dulles brothers the go ahead to carry out the Iranian coup. This correspondence shows how little Eisenhower knew about Iran outside of what the Dulles brothers had told him. It helps show the misguided leadership, and information and communication, because Eisenhower was willing to alienate Mossadeq at the order of the Dulles brothers, without bothering to learn anything of the situation himself.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Correspondence to Premier Mossadegh." Letter to Mohammed Mossadeq. 26 Feb. 1953. The Mossadegh Project. Mohammed Mossadegh, n.d. Web. 4 Jan. 2015.

In Eisenhower's cordial response he says he will take Mossadeq's views into consideration. This is interesting because at this time, he was aware that the Dulles brothers wanted to overthrow Mossadeq. This behavior was, frankly, blatantly dishonest and a reflection of the Dulles brothers' powerful influences over Eisenhower. In addition, it shows the American government's willingness to say one thing and do another, in this case misleading Mossadeq while planning to depose him. This source

Excised. "Anti-Tudeh Activities of Zahedi Government." CIA Memo. 10 Sept. 1953. Web. 2 Jan. 2015.

This primary source document, obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act, is a CIA memo regarding the anti-Communist actions of the Zahedi government installed by the CIA. Written by the Acting Chief of the CIA's division of Near East and Africa, the memo discusses the Zahedi government's plan to have a national crackdown on the Tudeh party in Iran. This memo is extremely relevant to our argument because it shows the intentions of the CIA through Zahedi. The CIA's ultimate goal and concern in the coup was the presence of the communist Tudeh party and their alleged gaining of power and influence. As such, their first goal upon installing their hand-selected new leader of Iran was to remove the communist threat. This is indicative of the Dulles brothers' leadership goals of destroying communism, and of the legacy of anti-communism that their leadership created.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. New York: Columbia UP, 1972. Print.

This source directly from the Cold War era was key in helping develop a connection between the cold war and the Iranian coup. This book took a worldly view when explaining everything that had happened, and how the world surrounding affected the cold war. This book went in depth into explaining every countries part and contribution to the events that led up to the cold war. This book also goes beyond and briefly explains how the arms race has led to a violent society today obsessed with staying "safe" from the enemy.

Golestan, Erahim. "Erahim Golestan Describes 28 Morad Coup." Interview. The Mossadegh Project. BBC Persian. England, n.d. Radio.

This is a very interesting first hand account of what it was like on the ground during the coup. It will help us with figuring out what the day of the coup was like and how the Dulles' actions had an affect on average people in Iran. In particular, this source describes

the violence behind the coup, and the seemingly obvious outside influences that were affecting the “revolution.” Golestan believes in the good intentions of Mossadeq as a representative of the people of Iran and as a staunch supporter of democracy, demonstrating the positive public opinion that the public held of Mossadeq and the hypocrisy with which the people of Iran later viewed the United States.

Haines, Gerald K. CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954. Rep. N.p.: n.p., n.d. National Security Archive. George Washington University. Web. 6 Jan. 2015.

In a report to the CIA, analyst G.K. Haines gives a fairly objective and fact-based description of the 1954 Guatemalan coup, which was the second CIA-sponsored deposition of a foreign government. It provided a very clear analysis of this event, which was useful in improving our understanding of the legacy of the Iranian coup in CIA foreign affairs.

"Interview with Reza Shah Pahlavi." Interview by Gerard De Villiers. *The Imperial Shah*. N.p., 1975. 15 Nov. 2014.

This brief, measured interview of Reza Shah Pahlavi shows some of the Shah's public opinions of his regime, and his ignorance of the general state of his nation. Essentially, he had neglected his duties as leader during his tenure as Shah and as a result lost touch with the needs of his people, who at the time were beginning to become restless with SAVAK's tight control over the population and the Shah's inability to improve the situation. The Shah seemed to believe that the overall population was relatively submissive to his “psychological pressures.”

Jefferson, Thomas. "Correspondence." Letter to Marquis De Lafayette. 2 Apr. 1790. MS. New York, New York.

In a personal letter to the Marquis de Lafayette, Founding Father Thomas Jefferson explains his goals for the new American government. In particular, he states that the ultimate goal of a government is to faithfully support the values upon which it was founded. In the case of the United States, he means that democracy should be the end goal of all of the new government's engagements, and that they should be honorable in their pursuits regardless of circumstances.

Kennan, George F. *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*. Foreign Affairs. 4 Jan. 2015. Web. 4 Jan. 2015.

The "X Article" was written by George F. Kennan, one of the most powerful voices in American foreign policy during the Cold War. In this article, Kennan outlines the theory of containment, a strategy to patiently but firmly contain Soviet expansion around the world. This is in contrast to John Foster Dulles's strategy of "rollback," the strategy to push back Soviet influences. Kennan essentially advocates for a slow but sure pro-democracy policy that will eventually be able to wear down the communists with help from the internal issues the USSR faces on its own.

Killian, James R., William O. Baker, Clark Clifford, James H. Doolittle, Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, William L. Langer, Robert D. Murphy, and Maxwell Taylor. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Report to the President. Rep. Comp. J. Patrick Coyne. N.p.: n.p., 1956. Print.

This report by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is a complete description of the CIA's lackluster processes for approving "policy procedure" (PP) actions, including the Iranian coup. In the most basic terms, there was no apparent evidence of any sort of checks on the power of the CIA, which was able to undertake impulsive operations with poor planning and evaluation of potential consequences. The authors express "concern" for the weak or nonexistent systems in place for quality control in the CIA, which were for the most part informal and proforma.

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Report. Rep. National Security Archive, 14 Apr. 2011. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

The Kirkpatrick report is a comprehensive internal CIA study detailing the Agency's role in Bay of Pigs Invasion. It concludes that, essentially, the CIA was extremely disorganized and ill prepared to handle an operation of the scale of the invasion. In a mirror of the Bruce-Lovett and Coyne reports following the Iranian coup, this report is extremely critical of the overall CIA execution, and states that it is imperative to fix these fundamental shortfalls within the Agency. In particular, it states that there were no measures in place to check the viability of such operations, which seemed to run out of control on the ideas of the leadership, leading to the blame on and eventual resignation of Allen Dulles as Director.

Koch, Scott A. "Zendabad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953" N.d. TS, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435. George Washington University. The National Security Archive. George Washington University, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. 18 Dec. 2014.

This declassified CIA document is the most recently released internal history of the 1953 Iranian coup by a CIA historian. Although heavily excised, it provides a valuable perspective of the coup from someone who witnessed the event but had no direct stake in it. Basically, Koch gives a plain summary of the coup and its aftermath. In comparison to other CIA documents, it is much less extreme in its opinions, suggesting that the people behind the coup were slightly biased and did not necessarily have accurate information or opinions.

"Marshall Plan (1947)." World History: The Modern Era. ABC-CLIO, 2015. Web. 6 Jan. 2015.

This primary source document, a speech by Secretary of State George Marshall, is the speech that announced the Marshall Plan, which was a crucial piece of the United States' post-World War II foreign policy. Marshall speaks of the dire need for the United States to help rebuild the democracies of Europe. This shows how at the time, American foreign policy was more centered around protecting and promoting democracy than actively fighting Communism. While this is due to the fact that the Cold War was not in full swing, this is also indicative of how the Dulles brothers' influence managed to change the very basis of American foreign policy. The legacy of their leadership lies in how America shifted from policies like the Marshall Plan to more active anti-Communist ones.

Mossadeq, Mohammed. "Mossadegh's Message to President Eisenhower." Letter to Dwight D. Eisenhower. 7 Jan. 1953. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. The Mossadegh Project. Mohammed Mossadegh. Web. 4 Jan. 2015.

In this direct correspondence to President Eisenhower, Mossadeq requests help the Eisenhower administration democratic growth in Iran. This shows that Mossadeq genuinely believed in democracy, asking for help from the United States government, despite wishing to stay neutral in the Cold War capitalism vs. communism conflict. It supports our argument for the legacy regarding the United State's Cold War ideology, in that it shows that the United States was willing to bend or break some of its values regarding democracy and freedom in order to stomp out what it perceived as communism around the world.

Mossadeq, Mohammed. "Mossadegh's Second Message to President Eisenhower." Letter to Dwight D. Eisenhower. 28 May 1953. The Mossadegh Project. MohammedMossadegh, n.d. Web. 4 Jan. 2015.

In this letter, Mossadeq is specifically outlining the troubles he is having in Iran to Eisenhower. He tells Eisenhower about the low standard of living of the Iranian people

and asks for assistance with the British government because Mossadeq is wishing to nationalize oil. What Mossadeq doesn't realize is that the planning for the coup is already underway. This was helpful in our leadership argument, because it shows how manipulative the Dulles and Eisenhower could be, posing as a friend when they had already been plotting against him.

"Mossadeq's Spy Service." N.d. TS, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435. George Washington University. The National Security Archive. George Washington University, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2014.

This internal CIA propaganda piece illustrates clearly the CIA perspective on Mossadeq's leadership in the Iranian government. According to the author, Mossadeq is a corrupt dictator and runs a widespread spy system in order to crush all internal opposition. The author continues to claim that Mossadeq held strong ties with the Tudeh and Moscow, and expresses a desire to break those ties and change the leadership situation in Iran.

Naftali, Timothy, George Eliades, Francis Gavin, Erin Mahan, Jonathan Rosenberg, David Shreve, Patricia Dunn, Philip Zelikow, and Ernest May, eds. *The Great Crises, Volume One*. Rep. National Security Archive, 2 Apr. 2014. Web. 6 Jan. 2015.

This compilation of President John F. Kennedy's correspondences includes a section regarding the Brazilian coup of 1964, another CIA backed operation. Basically, it helped us understand the background of the Brazilian coup, which was a direct "descendant" of the operation TPAJAX in 1953. Especially useful was a passage describing in general the effects of the coup, supporting our argument for the legacy of the 1953 operation.

National Security Act of 1947. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1947. Print.

The National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA, the United States' first peacetime intelligence agency. This document is important because it describes the purpose of the CIA's formation. The CIA was formed essentially to take over the functions of the OSS. Understanding the origins of the CIA and its original purpose is vital to understanding the power of the Dulles brothers and the changes their leadership made not just in the CIA, but in American government as a whole.

National Security Archive. Rep. George Washington University, 11 Dec. 2011. Web. 04 Jan. 2015.

In a report made during the Vietnam coup, the State Department describes the atrocities

committed by the various parties involved during the event. This source was mainly useful for outlining the South Vietnam coup, improving our understanding of the insidious legacy that the precedent of the Iranian coup left in 1953. Additionally, it provided very specific statements that would be helpful in explaining the impact of the event in the long run.

Nixon, Richard. "Richard Nixon on the 1953 Coup in Iran." Interview.CSPAN. CSPAN, 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2014.

Interestingly, this video interview is from 1991 and Richard Nixon, the Vice President under Eisenhower, admits Eisenhower's role in the overthrow of Mossadeq in a rare breach of confidentiality. He also defends Eisenhower's controversial decision to continue with the coup, despite the obvious role it played in the Revolution just a decade earlier and the turmoil is created within Iran and for US-Iranian relations.

Obama, Barack. "REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON A NEW BEGINNING." Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt. 4 June 2009. The White House. Web. 4 Jan. 2015.

This address by President Barack Obama in Egypt speaks of a thawing of relations between the United States and Middle Eastern nations, following their turbulent history. President Obama states that the American government wishes to normalize the relationships between their nations, after a decades-long hiatus. This shows us that only now are ties between the US and the Middle East, specifically Iran, being healed, following the coup and the subsequent revolution, due to the brash decisions of the Dulles brothers.

Pahlavi, Shah. "INTERVIEW WITH THE SHAH OF IRAN 1977." Interview by Barbara Walters. YouTube. ABC, 1977. Web. 29 Dec. 2014.

Interesting to see the Shah "in person." The most elucidating part was when the Shah is asked if Iran is getting money from the CIA and, and he brazenly lies, stating that Iran is not being funded by the United States. This helped us understand the relationship between Iran and the United States under the Shah, which was still clandestine at the time. Basically, we learned that the Shah was still a staunch supporter of the West even right before his deposition, in return for being placed into power, with his unwillingness to sell out his allies.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Arsenal of Democracy" Radio Address Delivered by President

Roosevelt, 1940. Radio Address, Washington DC. Address.

This source is a radio address given by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940 about how the United States must be an "arsenal of democracy." Roosevelt states that the United States must aid democracy in World War II by "by sending every ounce and every ton of munitions and supplies that we can possibly spare to help the defenders who are in the front lines." This source is extremely useful and relevant because it is indicative of the predominant idea of pro-democracy in United States foreign policy prior to the Dulles brothers, as opposed to the later zeitgeist of anti-communism. By presenting the blatant differences in foreign policy goals before the advent of the Dulles brothers' decisions, this speech shows the legacy of the Dulles brothers' leadership choices.

Roosevelt, Kermit. "CIA, Memo from Kermit Roosevelt to [Excised], July 16, 1953." (1953): n. pag. *The National Security Archive (George Washington University)*. CIA. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

This is a letter written by Kermit Roosevelt to an anonymous government official. It was declassified in 2011, along with a collection of other letters from Roosevelt. It is a primary source, and therefore gives exact insight into the planning process behind the coup. Although the typed letter is short, it shows some leadership on behalf of Kermit Roosevelt, in the form of simply planning, yet it also shows a lack of leadership in that the British and American intelligence agencies are having trouble persuading Zahedi to be the next ruler of Iran.

Roosevelt, Kermit. *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. *Mohsen.I.banan.byname.net*. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

Roosevelt's book, although partially censored, provides an in depth look at his perspective of the event, the planning of the event, and how they carried it out. Parts of it are simply a personal narrative and unhelpful, but there are extremely helpful sections that detail the planning process. Through what we have already deduced pertaining to the lack of leadership, there is a slight undertone of confusion, some small things that didn't go according to plan, even in the book that has been written such that these things aren't on the surface. This source helped determine where things went wrong in the coup, as a direct result of lack of leadership.

State Department. US-Iranian Friendship. Mossadegh Project. N.p., 9 May 2014. Web. 15 Nov. 2014.

This statement issued by John Foster Dulles immediately following the coup outlines his hopes for the US-Iranian relationship. As he puts it, he hopes that they will be able to do business with Iran as a members of the "family of free nations." This helps show that even though Dulles was being dishonest about US involvement in the coup, he may still have been truly interested in supporting Iran against Soviet influences, offering substantial amounts of emergency aid in response to "recent Communist-abetted disorders" in Iran, and hailing the Iranian ambassador to the United States with genuine respect.

"Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas on Mossadegh in Iran." *Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas on Mossadegh in Iran*. The Mossadegh Project, n.d. Web. 04 Jan. 2015.

This is a compilation of many primary sources from William O. Douglas who was a great admirer of Mossadegh. In a previous secondary source, Stephen Kinzer's book, we found it mentioned that Douglas was a big critic of the Dulles brothers. Because of this, his is an interesting perspective because he was one of the Dulles' only contemporaries who would probably agree with our argument that the Dulles' did more harm than good.

Taylor, Maxwell. *The Taylor Commission Report*. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 1984. *National Security Archive*. George Washington University. Web. 12 Feb. 2015.

This source was a report written by the Taylor committee in the wake of the Bay of Pigs invasion, but remained classified until a freedom of information suit was filed in 1984. The report discusses the failures and successes of the attempted invasion, pinning a significant amount of blame on the Dulles brothers, as well as the operation heads and president. The report was very helpful, because it was one of the few papers that has actually been declassified, and therefore was one of the few authoritative primary sources available. Overall, it was most helpful in dealing with the legacy of the Dulles brothers leadership, because it showed how their policies were still present in the government, even after the Iranian coup had already ended.

Townley, Michael. *National Security Archive*. Rep. George Washington University, 11 Sept. 1973. Web. 6 Jan. 2015.

This DINA report to the State Department covers the CIA-run coup in Chile in 1973, which was run by the same leadership as the original coup in 1953 - Allen Dulles. The report was most useful in explaining the Chilean operation, and provided us with elucidating quotes about the legacy of the Chilean coup and how it was affected by the CIA's policies formed during the 1953 operation in Iran.

Truman, Harry S. "Recommendation of Assistance to Greece and Turkey." Address of the President of the United States. 80th Congress 1st Session, Washington DC. 12 Mar. 1947. Truman Library. Web. 2 Jan. 2015.

This address by President Truman is the address in which he announced the policy of the Truman Doctrine. With the Truman Doctrine, Truman established that the United States would "support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." It is indicative of America's foreign policy at the time, one that ostensibly pledged to help democracy but in actuality was intended to combat communism. This primary source is relevant because it provides information about the goals of America's foreign policy prior to the Dulles brothers. Based on that information, it appears that the Dulles brothers were not the sole force in transitioning America's foreign policy from one of pro-democracy to one of anti-communism. Instead, the legacy of their actions in American foreign policy were likely an extension of a prevailing American zeitgeist.

Truman, Harry S. "The Truman Doctrine." *American Rhetoric*. Michael E. Eidenmuller, n.d. Web. 18 Feb. 2015.

The Truman Doctrine was a speech delivered by Harry S. Truman in March of 1947 before congress, where he clarified and outlined America's foreign policy of the Cold War. In addition to containing communism, the doctrine showed that America was willing to help protect other countries from Communism by using both financial and military methods. This source was particularly useful in defining our context argument, especially in the area of American foreign policy.

United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Clandestine Services History. *Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952 - August 1953*. By Donald N. Wilber. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

This service history of the 1953 Iranian coup, known as the Wilber reports, provide a complete history of the CIA's actions in Iran, and thus it is one of the most useful and relevant sources on the topic. While some names and details were altered and excised by the CIA, all of the vital information is accurate and intact. The source delves into details about the impetus for the coup, the reasoning behind decisions that were made, the situation in Iran, and other important aspects of the coup. Most importantly, it reveals the impulsive and misguided actions of the CIA during the coup. The reasoning behind many of the actions depicted in Wilber's report are flawed, and the leadership questionable.

This is a direct effect of a glaring lack of leadership at the top of the chain of command: the Dulles brothers. As a whole, the Wilbert report shows the legacy of the misguided leadership of the Dulles brothers, which was extremely vital in supporting our argument and aiding our research.

Wilson, Woodrow. Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War Against Germany (1917).

United States Congress, Washington DC. This source is an address from Woodrow Wilson to Congress discussing the United States' declaration of war against Germany during World War I. Woodrow Wilson emphasizes the importance of protecting democracy in the global scale. His justification for declaring war against Germany is that its actions in the war are threatening the very existence of democracy, so it is the duty of the United States to not only protect democracy for their own benefit, but for the entire world's. This source specifically shows the primary idea in United States foreign policy at the time: protecting and spreading democracy. This stands in strong contrast with its goals after the rise of the Dulles brothers, where they shifted from being pro-democracy to anti-communism. As such, this source emphasizes the legacy of the Dulles brothers' leadership decisions that changed the goals of United States foreign policy.

Wisner, Frank. "Memorandum." N.d. TS, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435. George Washington University. National Security Archive. George Washington University, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. 15 Dec. 2014.

This memo from Frank Wisner, one of the planners of Operation AJAX, is recommending a commendation for one of the other participants in the operation, even after evidence appears that the Shah has begun to implement his brutal regime of oppression. This primary source shows that the CIA lacked any foresight or even a desire to monitor the situation in Iran after the coup, despite the Shah's actions in the country.

Secondary Sources

Abrahamian, Ervand, Michael Barkan, Christopher En, Jake Hernandez, Avery Kaplan, and Justin Yannix. "Ervand Abrahamian Interview." Telephone interview. 7 Jan. 2015.

We were fortunate enough to arrange an interview with noted Iran expert and Middle East professor Ervand Abrahamian. He was extremely helpful in giving us info about American motives behind the coup and the leadership behind the American side of the

coup, among other topics. In particular, he explained how the Dulles brothers' preconceived ideas led them ignore other's ideas, even firing some who expressed contradictory opinions. The information he gave us painted a clearer picture of the Dulles brothers' leadership and gave us a better idea of the legacy of their actions.

Abrahamian, Ervand. "The 1953 Coup in Iran." *Science and Society* 65.2 (2001): 182-215. JSTOR. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This book by Ervand Abrahamian, an Iranian historian, helped describe the Iranian coup detail by detail. Within his book he goes deep into detail about how the coup was fabricated, and how the mindsets of the leaders greatly changed the success of the coup. This book talked about the brothers involved in the coup, and how their aggressive domination of the peace talks led to an unsuccessful coup and a destructive and long lasting legacy.

Abrahamian, Ervand. *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations*. New York: The New Press, 2013. Print.

Ervand Abrahamian is a historian of the Middle East specializing in modern Iran, and a professor at Baruch College of the City University of New York system. This book provides extensive and specific details about everything involving the coup, including CIA involvement and the legacy. Abrahamian discusses extensively the role of the CIA. Abrahamian argues that the United States was motivated to send the CIA into Iran not due to the threat of communism, but due to their oil interests. This differs from the argument of the majority of other historians who argue that communism was the primary motive. This draws into question what exactly the CIA hoped to achieve in Iran. While that remains relatively unclear, the legacy of its actions do not. Similar to what has been stated by other preeminent experts on Iran, like Stephen Kinzer, Abrahamian states that the coup led to events like the Islamic Revolution and the rise of extremist Islam. While the legacy of the CIA's actions are clear, the actions themselves are extremely questionable and mysterious, which is likely indicative of a lack of leadership.

Abrahamian, Ervand. Featherman Distinguished Lecture on Humanities: The 1953 Iranian Coup Revisited in 2012. University of New England. 24 Oct. 2012. Lecture.

In a lecture at UNE, Ervand Abrahamian details the coup and argues that it was motivated by US and British oil interests. Abrahamian, a historian at CUNY, claims that the Americans wanted continued easy access to Iranian oil, instead of the original belief that they were afraid of a Communist coup in the nation. He continues to show that the Tudeh

were not capable of a coup, despite earlier opinions. Also, Abrahamian states that by first attempting to install Qavam in the place of Mossadeq, and failing, they gave Mossadeq more legitimacy and popular support as a true nationalist. He concludes with the legacy of the coup in the modern day nuclear issue, saying that the Western imperialist tendencies originating from the coup continue to affect US-Iranian relations, with the US trying to constrain Iran.

Ali, Tariq. "Operation Iranian Freedom: Iran's Brief Experiment with Democracy Came to a Tragic End, Courtesy of Washington." *Nation* 18 Aug. 2003: 37. *Student Edition*. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

A common misconception about the Middle East is that it has has one oppressive ruler after another for thousands of years. This is not the case, this article discusses the times when Iran tried for democracy, most notably under Mohammed Mossadeq. This article, written by an established journalists, is about Stephen Kinzer's pro-Mossadeq book. It provides more context to support the claim that America and Britain royally messed up Iran for the next 50 years by overthrowing Mossadeq.

Amini, Fariba. "Fariba Amini." Telephone interview. 14 Dec. 2014.

Fariba Amini is an Iranian journalist and also the daughter of Mossadeq's personal lawyer who was very close with Mossadeq in the final years of his life. Amini provided an Iranian perspective towards the coup and explained her opinion to us that, rather than the leadership of the Dulles brothers being ardently anti communist, it was anti nationalist. She said that many of the leaders were driven by monetary gain. Also, she had a very ideological view of Mossadeq as a man who truly loved democracy. This is true, Mossadeq was an idealist which makes the legacy of the coup that much more crushing.

Bahrampour, Tara. "Patriot of Persia: A Review." *Washington Post* 21 July 2012: n. pag. Print.

Tara Bahrampour's review of Christopher de Bellaigue's book provides both an insightful summary of his views, as well as an excellent overview of the legacy of the 1953 coup. Bahrampour gives an excellent summary of Mossadeq's life preceding the coup, including his background, and therefore this serves as an excellent broad context source, as well as a helpful review. Both Bahrampour and Bellaigue offer sympathetic views towards Mossadeq, and seem him as a visionary who had so much to offer his country before he was tragically removed from power, and replaced by America's puppet. This source helps with the legacy argument, by describing an Iran that had maintained Mossadeq in power, as an illustrious, modernized country.

Bamberg, James H. "Mossadeq's Overthrow, August 1953." *The History of The British Petroleum Company*. Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. 488-90. Print.

In this book about what is now BP, Bamberg explains how BP wasn't the root of all the problems in the middle east today, it was merely a catalyst for the British and U.S. governments to oust communism in the middle east. This chapter focused on explaining how Mossadeq's decision to be uncompromising was the root of existing problems today, that the U.S. and brits were unwilling to make another oil compromise. Bamberg also states because Mussadiq wasn't willing to share on the oil front, the political reasoning behind the coup was naught but a simple excuse for wanting the oil.

Behrooz, Maziar. "Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33.3 (2001): 363-82. *JSTOR*. Web. 05 Oct. 2014.

In this journal, Maziar Behrooz provides an overview of the long term legacy of the 1953 coup, mainly concerning the Communist Tudeh party. Behrooz, a professor of history at SFSU, connects the coup to the downfall of the Tudeh party, and explains that they were never able to recover due to the timing of the coup in alongside a period of intra-party factionalism. Additionally, he states that the coup is at least partially responsible for the 1979 revolution in Iran, the tensions in current US-Iran relations, and the arrested development of Iran's national independence, with the institution of the Shah halting constitutional processes and the move toward nationalist leadership.

Bezhan, Frud. "Aftershocks of Iran's 1953 Coup Still Felt around the World, 60 Years Later." *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*. Broadcasting Board of Governors, 15 Aug. 2013. Web. 3 Oct. 2014.

Bezhan, an established investigative journalist who specializes in Iran, details the legacy of the coup in the present day. Citing various sources, he says that the coup was detrimental to Washington's standing in Iran, and in the long run paved the way for a powerful anti-American regime to come to power. It allowed two opposition groups, radical Islamists and radical leftists, to rise to prominence in the wake of the Shah. Also, the "success" of the coup encouraged the CIA to use similar tactics in other nations such as Guatemala, leading to strong legacies around the globe.

Bezhan, Frud. "Aftershocks Of Iran's 1953 Coup Still Felt Around The World, 60 Years Later." *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

Although this article was published by Radio Free Europe, a media outlet initially started by the CIA as a source of propaganda, it gave insight into the legacy of the coup. For example, in Iran under the Shah all political parties were oppressed which "paved the way for two political trends -- radical Islamists led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and radical leftists in the form of the militant Mujahedin-e Khalq." The repercussions of the coup are still felt in Iranian animosity and distrust of the United States.

Bill, James A. *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1988. Print.

This source was found after it was mentioned as "required reading" on US-Iranian relations by another journalist. It is an in depth history of Iran from the end of WWII to the 1980's and it explores how the US and Iran went from being best friends to bitter enemies. It also is very critical of American involvement in the 1953 coup. James A. Bill is a celebrated authority of Iranian history and a possible interview candidate for later on in our project.

Blake, Kristen. *The US-Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945-1962*. Lanham: U of America, 2009. Print.

Author Kristen Blake is a professor at Molloy College and an expert on the Cold War in the Near East. In her volume, Blake covers the political and economic developments in Iran in the context of the Cold War in a highly comprehensive manner, including the oil nationalization crisis of 1952. Taking a post-revisionist stance, she argues that the coup was caused primarily by US-Soviet rivalries, although her focus remains on the origins and impacts of the US-UK-Soviet rivalries in the region. Ultimately, this sourced helped put the coup in the context of the Cold War, and gave insight into the long-term effects of the conflicts.

Blum, William. *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II*. London: Zed, 2003. Print.

In this book, author William Blum, who is a historian, noted foreign policy critic, and former employee of the State Department, discusses the CIA's history of foreign interventions, with one section devoted to the 1953 Iranian Coup. Of particular interest is how much of a mess the entire United States operation in Iran was. In response to a State Department report that essentially stated that the Tudeh Party was not a threat, Kermit Roosevelt, the leader of Middle East operations of the CIA, said "I don't know what to make of that...[a US ambassador to Iran in 1953] thought that there was a serious danger that Mossadegh was going to, in effect, place Iran under Soviet domination." This shows

the lack of communication and leadership on the American side; the leader of operations didn't even know the purpose of what he was doing. Of course, lack of leadership leads to a negative legacy, which is exactly what happened in Iran. The Iranian people were forced to endure an oppressive reign under the Shah and his brutal SAVAK police force. This created the anti-U.S. sentiment that likely contributed to the rise of radical Islam in Iran.

Blum, William. "Iran 1953: Making It Safe for the King of Kings." *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II*. Monroe, Me.: Common Courage, 1995. 64-72. Print.

This book is very critical of the CIA and gave a factual account of what happened during and after the coup, juxtaposed against what Kermit Roosevelt and other CIA insiders said happened. It shows how unprepared and uninformed the CIA leadership was in examples such as quotes about the Tudeh threat that never actually give specific examples. It also shows how unprepared Kermit Roosevelt, the de facto leader in the Middle East, was. For example, he hired the two key Iranian agents the day before the coup.

Byrne, Malcolm. "Malcolm Byrne Interview." Telephone interview. 7 Jan. 2015.

Malcolm Byrne, deputy director of the National Security Archive, was fortunately willing to talk to us over the phone and answer a few of our questions. A large number of our primary sources came from his website at George Washington University that he and the National Security Archive obtained from the CIA through the Freedom of Information Act. He was helpful in giving us more information about the CIA, specifically the bureaucracy that prevented lower level specialists from voicing their concerns regarding the operation. Unfortunately, we weren't able to speak with him as long as we had hoped to, and we did not get much information about the Dulles brothers from him, but overall his interview was still very helpful in assisting our research.

Byrne, Malcolm. "Iranians Debate the 1953 Coup." *JSTOR*. MERP, 2000. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

In the recording of a television program between Iranian men, the coup is discussed in a different light, explaining how it affected their lives individually, giving an insight into a regular man's life. The men mainly focus on how the failure of the US to put a better leader in place, the new government began to fail, and the US's incessant need to eradicate communism may have influenced Iran for the worse.

Byrne, Malcolm. "Iran 1953: The Role of MI6, British Petroleum and Kermit Roosevelt's Countercoup." *The National Security Archive (George Washington University)*. George

Washington University, 13 May 2014. Web. 05 Oct. 2014.

Byrne, Director of research at the National Security Archive sponsored by Georgetown University, and author of several books chronicling the Middle East, provides a look at the censorship of the Iranian coup. He discusses it by looking at several key changes made to Kermit Roosevelt's book "Countercoup," with a specific focus on their keeping the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from being mentioned. The source provides a look into the British leadership of the coup, because all mentions of the AIOC were changed to "british intelligence." Therefore this shows that the British intelligence agency was essentially overpowered by an oil company. The source was published fairly recently, with the help of several recently declassified documents.

Caistor, Nick. "Forward." *Nunca Más*. Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas. London, Butler and Tanner Ltd. Frome, 1986.

This secondary source was a forward to a book, written by Nick Caistor, a published historical author very knowledgeable about the Dirty War that took place in Argentina. In the forward he goes into depth about the repercussions of the Dirty War and "los desaparecidos" and what it means for the modern world. This is helpful for the legacy argument because it helps put the Iranian Coup into context with other CIA covertly backed coups. Additionally, the author provides easily quotable statements, compatible with a timeline in the legacy argument.

Cohen, Roger. "The New York Times Upfront | The News Magazine for High School." *The New York Times Upfront*. Scholastic & The New York Times, n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2014.

Roger Cohen's well written and authoritative article more than adequately describes the legacy of the 1953 Iranian coup, in describing the lead up, the events of, and what happened immediately after the Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis at the end of the 1970's. Cohen is a well established journalist who has worked as a foreign correspondent in fifteen countries including places in the middle east, which ensures he has the necessary background to make this article credible. It ties in well to our topic, because we need evidence on how the lack of strong leadership in the 1953 coup lead to a bad legacy.

Conlin, Joseph Robert. *The American Past: A Survey of American History Enhanced Edition*. Vol. II. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2011. 756-58. Print. Since 1865.

This book, written by Historian Joseph Conlin, was particularly helpful because it devoted a significant portion of its Cold War section to discussing the impact of the

Dulles brothers. The book gave us a great summary of what the Dulles brothers did in Iran as well as in other countries, like Guatemala, which is useful for our legacy argument. What was particularly helpful about this source was that it talked about how Eisenhower often deferred power to Dulles in terms of foreign affairs. This was extremely helpful in backing up our argument that a lack of checks and balances around the Dulles brothers led to their increase of leadership power.

Connor, John T., Ronald Reagan, and Nelson A. Rockefeller. *Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975. Print.

This primary document is a report to Gerald Ford on the actions of the CIA, and times when it did things outside of its authority. It shows that CIA and FBI leadership at times worked against each other at the expense of national security, however the CIA has had good ties with state and local police despite that the CIA is only supposed to deal with foreign affairs. This document also shows how the legacy of the CIA was shaped by the laws saying what it could and could not do.

Cottam, Richard W. "American Policy and the Iranian Crisis." *Iranian Studies* 13.1-4 (1980): 279-305. Web. 4 Oct. 2014.

This journal article by Richard Cottam places a heavy hand on how the internal conflicts in Iran made it weak and therefore susceptible to other countries such as the US trying to extort its resources. These internal conflicts he stated were how the separation between the religious government and the secular government wasn't clear. This uncertainty in the government made it clear to the US that something had to be done about the lack of leadership, therefore the US decided to replace the current leader with a pre-chosen one. This helped Iran's government for a while, and it also played towards the US's interests.

Cottam, Richard W. "The United States, Iran and the Cold War." *Iranian Studies* 3.1 (1970): 2-22. *JSTOR*. Web. 20 Sept. 2014.

Professor and Iranist Richard Cottam of the University of Pittsburgh overviews American foreign policy in Iran during the Cold War. In particular, he states that while some historians believe oil interests provided the primary motive for US actions, there is little evidence of such; instead, American perceptions of a communist threat colored American foreign policy. Essentially, Cottam creates an overview of the events and motives of American actions in Iran during the Cold War, and contextualizes the coup in a broader period of Iranian history.

de Bellaigue, Christopher. "Coupdunnit: what really happened in Iran?" *Foreign Affairs* Sept.-Oct. 2014. *Global Issues in Context*. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This source was very useful in determining how modern day Iran has been affected by past events. This source does a great job of explaining the past events that helped generate the turmoil that exists today. This article goes on to explain how the coup was a crucial part of the current events, and how the removal of the first democratically elected prime minister leader was soon ousted and replaced by a long string of leaders who weren't necessarily bad, but leaders who did not improve upon the pegs of Iran, but simply stayed within the traditional ideas of thinking, and did not bring new. This article also explained how the coup and the hostage crisis led to anti-us sentiments that carry through today.

De Luce, Dan. "The Spectre of Operation Ajax." *The Guardian*. N.p., 20 Aug. 2003. Web. 3 Oct. 2014.

In this context source, author Dan De Luce provides a summary of the events of the 1953 Iranian Coup. While the article did help by providing a general understanding of what it was like in Iran in 1953, and the American and British involvement, it is primarily interesting because it suggests that American actions in Iran led to Islamic hostility toward the United States. De Luce says that American involvement in Mossadegh's overthrow helped "unleash a wave of Islamic extremism and assisted to power the anti-American clerical leadership that still rules Iran." This provides a definitive legacy of America's involvement in the coup; after two decades under the dictatorial Shah, the Iranian people's resentment turned toward America. Based on what other articles we have read have said about the organization and leadership of the CIA, it is clear that poor leadership on the American side led to this legacy in Iran. The Guardian is a reputable publication, so this source is most likely trustworthy.

Divine, Robert A. "Eisenhower and the Middle East." *Eisenhower and the Cold War*. New York: Oxford UP, 1981. N. pag. Print.

This chapter gave some historical context for what was going on with the rest of the Cold War conflict around the time of the Coup. For one thing, Washington did not know what to make of the news that Stalin had died, they had little to no inside information and they did not know how his death would affect the Soviet Union. A few months before the Coup Eisenhower gave his "Atoms for Peace" speech which showed that he wanted to lead the United States into a new era of peace with the Russians. His words are contradictory to the

reality of what would happen in a few months time. This book showed that despite good willed leaders, resolving the Cold War conflict would take a lot more.

Doenecke, Justus D. "Revisionists, Oil and Cold War Diplomacy." *Iranian Studies* 3.1 (1970): 23-33. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

Justus D. Doenecke, Professor of History at New College of Florida, explains the revisionist viewpoint of American policy in Iran during the Cold War. A desire for natural resources, namely oil, drove the American forces in the region, eventually leading to the coup in 1953. In general, the journal places the coup in a larger context of American policy in Iran during the time, helping to illustrate the role the coup played during the Cold War in Iran.

Dujmovic, Nicholas. "Intelligence in Public Literature." *Central Intelligence Agency*. Central Intelligence Agency, 05 Feb. 2013. Web. 05 Oct. 2014.

In reviewing Sarah-Jane Corke's book, Nicholas Dujmovic (a member of CIA's History Staff at the Center for the Study of Intelligence), highlighted parts of Corke's argument such as the lack of CIA leadership or efficiency in the beginning was partly due to the Truman administration not having a comprehensive plan for fighting communism. When left to its own devices, the CIA tended to follow the Donovan model of cowboy diplomacy, however, Dujmovic makes the point "the fact is that there was significant policy input from both State and the Pentagon for CIA operations in the Far East in the early 1950s, most of which... were unsuccessful. All this suggests that CIA shares the blame for these failures with other parts of the government and that better coordination doesn't necessarily lead to better or more successful covert action."

Frazer, Simin. "Simin Frazer." Telephone interview. 6 Jan. 2015.

Simin Frazer grew up in a wealthy family in Iran in the 1960s, but she is now an American citizen. She answered our questions regarding what it was like for an average citizen following the coup. Her family did well under the Shah, but she has since come to realizations about his regime. One interesting thing she said was that she never learned about the 1953 coup in school, the Shah as a leader was a fact of life. Overall, she was able to enlighten us in regard to the chaotic but discordant civilian experience following the coup.

Engdahl, William. *A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order*. London: Pluto, 2004. Print.

This source is a book that goes in depth explaining about how politics and oil have been interconnected for the past century. This source also explained how some political leaders took this opportunity of the coup to take advantage of the public eye, so people such as Zbigniew Brzezinski took credit for helping out the situation in Iran. Although he took credit, it was mostly the US and British governments, not one single person that helped lift out the corrupt shah.

Gasiorowski, Mark. "Just Like That: How the Mossadeq Government Was Overthrown." *The Iranian*. The Iranian, 7 July 2000. Web. 12 Feb. 2015.

This source was yet another helpful source from Professor Gasiorowski. In it, he essentially includes the highlights of the Donald Wilber report, a document that has been a huge part of our research. He also combines some of his own findings with the information included in the report. One of the most important things in this source was his discussion of the dismissal of Roger Goiran. Although it is only mentioned in the Donald Wilber report that Goiran was dismissed from duty in Tehran, Gasiorowski explains that this was because he did not agree with TPAJAX, and was therefore dismissed, presumably by Allen Dulles. This is another reflection of the willful blindness displayed by the Dulles brothers. They were unwilling to accept views that contradicted their own, a testament to their stubborn leadership style.

Gasiorowski, Mark. "Mark Gasiorowski Interview." Telephone interview. 6 Jan. 2015.

Mark Gasiorowski is one of the leading experts regarding the 1953 coup. In the 1980s he interviewed many people, who have since died, who were directly involved in the coup. He also taught in Tehran. He complicated our thinking in many aspects of our project and added nuances such as the differences between Eisenhower as a republican leader and Truman as a democrat leader. He also added to previous knowledge which we had gained from Stephen Kinzer about the true legacy of the 1953 coup. In his words, it was simply a factor that was separated by 25 years, not a direct cause and effect relationship. This was a very helpful interview.

Gasiorowski, Mark J. "The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19.03 (1987): 261-86. *JSTOR*. Web. 1 Oct. 2014.

Gasiorowski, political scientist at Tulane University, gives an overview of the political and operational decisions behind the coup. As he explains it, conflicting points of view between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, as well as within each entity, led to serious

bureaucratic failure in the American decision making process. The leaders, including Eisenhower, A. Dulles, and others, supported the coup, but lower level specialists recognized the potential consequences of such an undertaking. Not only were the leaders unable to win the support of their subordinates, they themselves were noncommittal for a long time, and when they did make the final decisions they either lacked accurate information on Iran's political situation or chose to ignore the facts.

Gasiorowski, Mark J., and Malcolm Byrne. *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*. Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 2004. Print.

This book is one of the definitive resources on the coup. It covers almost every detail. The two authors, Gasiorowski and Byrne, are two of the preeminent experts on the coup in Iran. One of the aspects of this book that made it so special was that it had much more detail about the Dulles brothers than other accounts of the coup. While in other books and articles, only vague mentions of the CIA and the State Department are included, in this book the Dulles brothers are explicitly tied to their actions and the legacy of those actions. This book was instrumental for us in formulating our views on the leadership of the brothers.

Gasiorowski, Mark J. "The CIA Looks Back on the 1953 Coup in Iran." *Middle East Report* 216 (2000): 4-5. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This article was written with nearly 50 years of hindsight on the events of the Iranian Coup, but it was also written a year before 9/11. From this perspective, it explores how the CIA has changed, or failed to change since it's first covert overthrow of a foreign regime. The legacy of the CIA's initial action in 1953 can still be felt in CIA's operations today and it's continued involvement in the Middle East. However, after the 1970s, the CIA became markedly smaller so the legacy of the coup was somewhat diminished at that time.

Gates, Robert M. "Intelligence, Democracy, and Freedom." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 22.2 (1992): 231-37. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

This essay is based on Robert M. Gates' address in March 1992 at the 23rd Annual Student Symposium, Center for the Study of Presidency. Gates, former director of the CIA and Secretary of Defense, refers to William Donovan as "the founder of modern American intelligence." He describes Donovan's leadership and significance in creating the CIA, and the legacy of the organization. Given that the essay is published in a reputable journal, and that the speaker of the address of which the essay is derived is extremely authoritative, this is a very trustworthy source.

Gavin, Francis J. "Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950-1953." (n.d.): n. pag. Harvard. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

Francis J. Gavin manages to make Iranian politics of the 1950's sound interesting, even while talking about yawn-inducing topics such as religious ties towards economic policy. This academic writing was beneficial to researching the coup because it was important to have a strong background knowledge of Iranian politics. Additionally, Gavin is an extremely well established expert on American foreign policy.

Ghosh, Palash. "Iran: The Long Lasting Legacy of the 1953 U.S./CIA Coup." *International Business Times*. International Business Times, 20 Mar. 2012. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

In an interview with a college professor, this source stresses to find the legacy of the coup, and all the sentiments towards the event. This article also does a good job of going into detail about country relations and how previous leaders and different countries impacted Iran's history. From this source I learned much more about relations, such as the U.S suffered much blowback from the coup, because the new leader did help consolidate power, but public opinion of him wasn't high, making it seem as if he was a puppet. This sparked the beginning of Iranian disdain towards the U.S.

Grim, Ryan. "BP's Long History Of Destroying The World." *The Huffington Post*. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 08 June 2010. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

In this short article, the author obviously has a bias towards the Oil Company for causing many of the problems in the Middle East. This source wasn't one-hundred percent reliable, but it did provide another side of the argument stating that bad leadership wasn't the reason for the coup, but rather it was for the control of oil. This article says the main and only reason for the coup was for oil, focusing on the economic view of the coup rather than political. Although this article is rather one sided, the author does provide very in depth reasoning into why he feels the way he does. Overall this article is well written and does provide decent information.

Hader, Leon. "Our Man in Iran: How the CIA and MI6 Installed the Shah." *Our Man in Iran: How the CIA and MI6 Installed the Shah*. N.p., 16 Feb. 2013. Web. 05 Oct. 2014.

Hader, global affairs journalist in the Middle East and critic of American policy in the Middle East, paints a very negative picture of the American Intelligence in charge of the Iranian Coup. He puts Muhammad Mossadeq in a new light, describing how his goal was

not to align with the Soviets, but rather to avoid the Cold War conflict all together, and that the nationalization of the AIOC was to protect economic interests, not to spite the British. This source reveals leadership in a new way, showing how the first-world countries acted out of fear, rather than logically seeing the situation. It was written before the declassification of all Iranian Coup documents, but that changes little as the truth was already published.

Hardy, Thomas S. "Intelligence Reform in the Mid-1970s." *Central Intelligence Agency*. Central Intelligence Agency, 04 Aug. 2011. Web. 21 Oct. 2014.

This article told us a lot about the leadership within the CIA by comparing the the leadership of Allen Dulles in a fledgling branch of government, to the somewhat humiliated leaders of the CIA in the 1970s who were looking to open a new chapter on United States intelligence gathering. One thing they changed in these reform meetings of the 1970s was they passed laws making the CIA more accountable to the Senate. This showed by comparison how unaccountable the CIA had previously been.

Heaps, Jennifer D. *Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic Services* 61.2 (1998): 287-308. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

This source provides information about the OSS, the precursor to the CIA. It delves into detail about how the OSS gathered information and how it functioned. As the CIA eventually would take over the functions of the OSS, the article sheds valuable light on the origins of the CIA and its information gathering tactics. We used this source primarily as a way for providing context for our argument in our website. As the CIA was derived from the OSS, knowing the details of the functions and roles of the OSS is important to understanding the development of the CIA and its own roles.

Heiss, Mary Ann. "The United States, Great Britain, and the Creation of the Iranian Oil Consortium, 1953–1954." *Taylor & Francis*.

The International History Review, 1994. Web. 28 Sept. 2014. This source was written by a historical journal that made a memo of a meeting in Iran in 1954. This document focused on how the events surrounding the coup changed the world more than the coup itself, explaining how oil is one of the biggest factors that decided the US's decision to intervene, but also in the process of obtaining oil, also stopped the spread of communism. This document also pays tribute to the oil negotiations in 1954 that Herbert Hoover Jr. had called 'perhaps the largest commercial deal ever put together.'

Hilsman, Roger. "Does the CIA Still Have a Role?" *Foreign Affairs* 74.5 (1995): 104-16. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

This source discusses the changing role of the CIA, and is therefore particularly relevant to the organization's legacy. The article discusses the relevance of the CIA's primary functions, like covert political actions, code-breaking, espionage, or esoteric functions. The author argues that, while once useful during periods such as the Cold War, the CIA's primary functions are no longer cost effective or necessary. The author questions the purpose of the CIA's existence as a whole, and therefore its legacy as an organization. The article was found in a reputable journal, and while the author's personal views must be taken into account, the information is authoritative and trustworthy.

Historian, Clayton Laurie-Cia. "A New President, a Better CIA, and an Old War: Eisenhower and Intelligence Reporting on Korea, 1953." *The Evolution of CIA under Eisenhower* 54.4 (2010): n. pag. Web.

This article was very helpful in explaining Eisenhower's role in the growth of the CIA into a true "cowboy" organization. An important distinction was made between the Republican leaders under Eisenhower and the more liberal leaders under Truman. This source illuminated our knowledge of the leadership behind the government at the time of the coup.

"History of Iran: A Short Account of 1953 Coup." *History of Iran: A Short Account of 1953 Coup*. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This broad context source provided us some basis to our argument. It provided names of leaders and a blow by blow of the event itself. The actual on the ground operation was led by Kermit Roosevelt, and it was to put it lightly, a fiasco. Initial attempts at the coup failed and it seemed like all was lost, until a riot incited by the CIA and its propaganda and its thugs brought down Mossadeq. If this poor leadership and confusion is any indication of the larger organization, the CIA should prove to be quite a mess.

"History of the Central Intelligence Agency." *Fas.org*. Federation of American Scientists, n.d. Web. 04 Oct. 2014.

This article from the Federation of American Scientists talks about the origins of the CIA. While the value of centralized intelligence was made clear after World War II, the inception of the CIA was a troubled and controversial process. William Donovan, who is credited as the creator of the CIA, wanted an organization that would "correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies." His plan was opposed by many

different government departments. It is clear that at that time, many Americans did not support the creation of the CIA, but in the wake of World War II, it was deemed a necessary evil. An interesting thing mentioned in the article is how, as time passed, the CIA grew larger in size and influence, yet its actions became increasingly secretive. This is relevant to the coup in Iran, about which the CIA was extremely secretive. Based on the article's description of the organization's structure and its secrecy, the negative legacy left in Iran by the CIA could very well be a product of poor leadership. The secrecy of the organization likely provided a sort of veil that gave its leaders a safety net to make poor decisions; in the event that they failed, nobody would know who to blame.

"History of the CIA." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, 18 Feb. 2014. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This source was very helpful in determining how the CIA was brought up, and why that affected the events surrounding it. This source went into the history of how originally the CIA was the OSS, which was born out of the aftermath of World War II. This source also talked about the leaders of the CIA, and how each leader and their different ideology affected the overall leadership of the CIA. The history of everything the CIA was involved with was not discussed however, many of the covert operations and failures that we learned about were not discussed as to make the CIA look good.

Holsti, Ole. "The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs." *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique* 3.1 (1970): 123-57. JSTOR. Web. 04 Oct. 2014.

Ole Holsti, professor of political science at Duke University, provides an intensive, extensive, and highly systematic analysis of J. Dulles's beliefs as a political leader. In short, he had very strong beliefs in the power of morality, was pessimistic in the short term but optimistic long-run, and believed that inflexibility in political goals was extremely important to defend credibility and preserve perceived strength. Additionally, Holsti states J. Dulles's belief that a leader's spiritual qualities directly affect foreign policy, implying that J. Dulles sought to have a strong influence on international affairs, including the coup.

Holsti, Ole R. "Will the Real Dulles Please Stand Up." *International Journal* 30.1, Diplomatic Method (1974): 34-44. JSTOR. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

Ole Holsti, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Duke University, creates an image of J. Dulles as an idealistic and rigid leader whose ambition blinded him to the consequences of many of his actions. By choosing to ignore or suppress many of the opinions of his

subordinates, J. Dulles ran a very dictatorial system, where he made many decisions without outside input. This perhaps caused J. Dulles to make many imprudent choices, resulting in many negative long-term consequences such as the legacy of the coup.

Hoopes, Townsend. "God and John Foster Dulles." *Foreign Policy* No. 13 (1973): 154-77. JSTOR. Web. 16 Feb. 2015.

Townsend Hoopes, former Undersecretary of the Air Force, creates a collage of analyses of several works on John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State in this journal article, in addition to his own conclusions. Hoopes acknowledges several points of view of Foster Dulles's character and ideals, including that he was extremely religious and that he was driven by ambition. Hoopes himself, though, argues that Dulles was simply too rigid in his beliefs, unwilling to give any quarter in his foreign policy and other decision making responsibilities. This seems to agree with other authoritative perspectives, especially because Smith does not make a strong judgement on Dulles's actual beliefs, just that Dulles was a poor leader, unable to synthesize multiple perspectives and sources of information to make a balanced judgement.

Immerman, Richard H. "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology* 1.2 (1979): 21-38. JSTOR. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

In describing the relationship between J. Dulles and Eisenhower, Immerman, a professor at Temple University, brings up two different views of their leadership dynamic, especially regarding the Cold War. The first and more commonly accepted is that J. Dulles's forceful style dominated Eisenhower's more passive leadership, but the second claims that Eisenhower had more control than previously thought. Both perspectives help understand the how the bureaucratic machine that is the American government functioned during the Iranian coup.

Immerman, Richard H. *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990. Print.

Professor Immerman of Temple University describes J. Dulles as a much more calculating leader than other analysts have described, although he concedes that he was not necessarily any more farsighted than previously thought. Immerman creates an argument for the ability of J. Dulles as a diplomat who was able to use his leadership skills to effectively guide and force what he wanted out of others.

Johnson, Loch K. "Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 33.1 (1989): 81-109. *JSTOR*. Web. 12 Oct. 2014.

Johnson, a professor of political science at the University of Georgia, provides a history of the decision making process for covert action in the US government. By his description, the vast majority of the modern day process, including almost all of the official controls and examinations, were only implemented after the Nixon administration. Before, the leaders of the CIA had free reign, and went largely unchecked in the actions abroad, creating the potential for dangerous or even disastrous covert operations to transpire, such as the 1953 Iranian coup.

Kangas, Steve. "Timeline of CIA Atrocities." *Serendipity* (2002): n. pag. *Microsoft Academic Search*. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

In this article, written by a former military intelligence worker, the history of the CIA is chronicled to support the authors argument that the CIA should be dismantled because of its pattern of orchestrating military coups with legacies of human rights abuses and then censoring media about the CIA's involvement in failed coups. It makes the point that from its inception, the CIA lacked moral leadership because the CIA leadership only answered to the President according to the National Security Act of 1947.

Karasipahi, Sena. "Comparing Islamic Resurgence Movements in Turkey and Iran." *The Middle East Journal* 63.1 (2009): 87-107. *JSTOR*. Web. 5 Oct. 2014.

When initially choosing our topic we knew that the oppressive regime of the Shah had led to religious institutions being the only place where citizens could express dissent and this is why the Ayatollah Khomeini was able to overthrow the Shah. This article, however, explains how much more complex the reasons for the Islamic Revival in Iran were. The author, a professor at Texas A&M University, sites "denunciation of subservience to the US," as only one reason. Others include the influence of reformist intellectuals during the 1970s, the traditions of Shi'a Islam, and Islam as an ideology to take refuge in to confront Westernization and its challenges.

Kinzer, Stephen. *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*. Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons, 2003. Print.

All the Shah's Men is a fantastic book and source. It held so much information directly related to our topic. It clearly outlines the leadership of Allen Dulles and others such as

resistance fighters who made this coup possible. Possibly the best part of this book is that the author is not only an author but also somewhat of an investigative journalist. A majority of his information are things such as interviews, public sources, and declassified information. This book covers so much information ranging to the lives of those involved in the coup, to things such as the fact Mohammad Mossadeq often wore pajamas during affairs of state with officials. Kinzer also provides speculation for the relevance today, with an argument backing it up.

Kinzer, Stephen. "BP and Iran: The Forgotten History." *CBSNews*. CBS Interactive, 2010. Web. 05 Oct. 2014.

In this news article written by the Stephen Kinzer, the blame for issues within Iran's government are rested on the shoulders of BP (British Petroleum). Kinzer stated BP was overzealous and wished to profit heavily from Iran, and take it's resources. This lead Mossadeq to take on a nationalistic value, and take back Iran's oil to maximize their countries profit. Britain did not want the oil to fall into the hands of the communists, so Operation Ajax was put into place. Kinzer explains how the lack of authority and cooperation in operation ajax led to the end of democracy in iran, eventually leading to new leaders with an anti-western attitude.

Kinzer, Stephen. *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

This book is where we initially came up with our idea for history fair. As the title would suggest, it deals mainly with the leadership of the Dulles brothers. It begins with a thorough, albate dramatized, depiction of their youth and schooling and thus describes how they grew up to be the men they became. The rest of the book is split up into the six main countries where they carried out their "secret war" to get rid of leaders that went against their American values. The most valuable knowledge about their leadership which I took away from this book is that, as the most high concentration of power between relatives in the US in history, their opinions and policies were essentially an echo chamber of each other. Their leadership was close minded, and this led to disastrous results.

Kinzer, Stephen. "The Brothers." *Politics and Prose*, Washington, D.C. 03 Oct. 2013. Lecture.

In a lecture for *Politics and Prose*, acclaimed journalist and academic Stephen Kinzer explains some of the Dulles brothers' reasons for initiating the coup in Iran. First, being raised extremely religiously, they believed in the stark contrast between "good" and "evil," and that as Christians they had to actively combat immorality around the globe.

Additionally, as lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell, the Dulles's original jobs were to protect American business interests from governments around the world, and their first shocking defeat came when Iran nationalized its oil industry, causing the Dulles's to have a huge grudge once they arrived in office in 1953. As brothers with almost identical worldviews, they did not consult or seek approval from others, and instead were convinced from the start of their decisions. Finally, Eisenhower's opinions regarding defense - that covert operations were superbly effective - only encouraged them to continue with their plans to overthrow Mossadeq, despite their admitted lack of information.

Kinzer, Stephen. "FTMWeekly Interview: Stephen Kinzer on Operation Ajax and the Blowback from Iran Since 1953." Interview by Jerry Robinson. *FTM Daily*. FTM Daily, 11 Feb. 2012. Web. 12 Oct. 2014.

We have used many sources from Stephen Kinzer, as he appears to be the preeminent expert on the 1953 Coup in Iran and Operation AJAX. This is an extremely useful interview because Kinzer's argument is that the CIA and the United States' involvement in the coup directly led to its current conditions. Kinzer states that in Iran, the common sentiment people give him is, "We used to have a democracy here. But you Americans came over here and destroyed it. And ever since then, we've been spiraling down." Kinzer also states that CIA intervention in Iran led to a "clique of fanatically anti-American mullahs who are in power now." Kinzer forms a direct connection between CIA actions in Iran and the legacy of the rise of extremist Islam. Not only does Kinzer discuss the legacy, however; he ties it back to CIA actions and its leadership, or lack thereof. Kinzer says that sending the CIA to Iran sent Iran into "total chaos," and that when you look back at the event, it is clear that "the American role in crushing Iranian democracy in 1953...set Iran and the Middle East into turmoil from which it has never recovered." Due to its actions during the coup that resulted from lack of leadership, America and its organizations like the CIA are responsible for the negative legacy.

Kinzer, Stephen. "How Two Brothers Waged A 'Secret World War' In The 1950s." Interview by Arun Rath. *NPR*. NPR, 2013. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

Stephen Kinzer succinctly and eloquently describes the argument in his book during this interview. He talks about how the Dulles brothers were influenced by their protestant upbringing to not sit back and let bad things happen, but to intervene, and also that the world is very black and white and split up into good and evil. The Dulles brothers leadership in waging a secret war beginning in 1953 showed the influence of their leadership and also represented the covert and overt parts of American Foreign Policy.

Finally, Kinzer discussed the legacy of American secret intervention around the world and how American's these days are more aware of it. (Avery)

Kinzer, Stephen. "Inside Iran's Fury." *Smithsonian*. Smithsonian Magazine, Oct. 2008. Web. 05 Oct. 2014.

Stephen Kinzer has written many books and articles about the United States' involvement in the coup in Iran, and given his history as a correspondent for the New York Times and as an academic, he is clearly an expert in this field. In this article, Kinzer tells Iran's side of the story. Iran has had a long history of being dominated by foreign powers, and the CIA's role in the coup as well as the American funding of the Shah only exacerbated the intense resentment the Iranian people built up. The coup itself was a poor leadership decision by the CIA, only initiated due to a "wild distortion" about a Communist threat that the British fed to the CIA. Additionally, the decision "was all very emotional and very quick. There was no real attempt to find out who Mossadegh was or what motivated him." As a result of poor American leadership, anti-United States sentiment continued to build up in Iran, resulting in the 1979 hostage crisis and the legacy of an anti-American sentiment that permeates to this day.

Kinzer, Stephen. "Kinzer Interview." Telephone interview. 6 Dec. 2014.

Our first interview was illuminating in the area of leadership because Kinzer wrote the book which initially gave us the idea to study the Dulles brothers in this project. He also further explained the coup's legacy in Iran. Specifically, he said that a direct cause and effect line could be drawn between the events of 1953 and the eventual revolution in 1979. Finally, he directed us toward some very good primary sources to speak with, including Malcolm Byrne and Mark Gasiorowski's works on the coup.

Kornbluh, Peter. "Top Secret CIA 'Official History' of the Bay of Pigs: Revelations." *Top Secret CIA 'Official History' of the Bay of Pigs: Revelations*. National Security Archive, 15 Aug. 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2015.

This article was written by Peter Kornbluh, an expert who does research for the National Security Archive, a program sponsored by George Washington University. Kornbluh is an expert on many of the CIA's covert operations as well as much of America's foreign policy during the Cold War. This source provides access to many primary documents published from within the CIA on the Bay of Pigs. Kornbluh provides short summaries of all of the documents, as well as a written report on his own view on the operation. Therefore it was very helpful in providing commentary for the legacy argument, and in showing how the

Dulles brothers leadership tendencies were not isolated to the Iranian coup, but rather were suggestive of their entire time spent in power.

Landay, Jonathan S. "Obama's Drone War Kills 'others,' Not Just Al Qaida Leaders." McClatchy DC. The McClatchy Company, 9 Apr. 2013. Web. 16 Feb. 2015.

This online article in the well known newspaper McClatchy DC covers an exclusive review of classified CIA reports on recent drone strikes in Pakistan. According to the journalist, the classified reports document the shortfalls of the CIA's drone strike program, and how it had misled Congress and the American public about the extent and nature of its activities. The article helped us understand how the legacy of willful blindness begun by the Dulles brothers in the 1953 coup still affects modern US foreign policy, even outside of its "traditional" king-making roles as in the 1953 coup. Additionally, the lack of checks on CIA and executive power is made apparent in the reports, which allowed the organizations to continue with their unsavory activities without releasing information about them.

Little, Douglas. "Chapter 2." *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2002. 43-46. Print.

In this book about Iranian-American relations, the author outlines the legacy of the bureaucratic failures leading up to the coup in 1953. The author states that the lack of supporters of Mossadeq's regime was partial in influencing his decisions. Overall the author said that the failure to come to a solid compromise over the oil caused many of the long lasting problems today. The author also noted how the situations could have been avoided if the United States greed had not clouded its political agenda.

Little, Douglas. "1949-1958, Syria: Early Experiments in Covert Action." *Press for Conversion!* 51 (2003): 12-13. Web.

Written by Douglas Brown, a professor at Brown University, this secondary source provides insight into the Syrian coup which was aided by the CIA from 1949 to 1958. It elaborates on the Dulles role in the coup, primarily John Foster Dulles's, but the source was primarily used for the legacy argument, specifically for reference to the legacy in American foreign policy. It helps show the relation of the Iranian Coup to other covert operations carried out by the CIA during the Cold War, and provides quotable statements which are extremely useful for the website.

Marsh, Steve. "The United States, Iran and Operation 'Ajax': Inverting Interpretative Orthodoxy." *Middle Eastern Studies* 39.3 (2003): 1-38. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This article discusses the United States involvement in the 1953 Iranian Coup. It goes into detail about the objectives and motives of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The article argues that ultimately, the United States' motivation to get involved in the coup was to stop the spread of communism. The Eisenhower administration had reached a point where its only two options in Iran were "writing Iran off to communism as an expendable asset," or Operation AJAX. The article is relevant because it discusses the leadership of the people behind the American side of the coup. The article was published in a respected journal, and is likely reliable.

Matin-Daftari, Hedayat. "Hedayat Matin-Daftari: Mossadeq's Legacy Today." *MERIP Reports* No. 113. Iran Since the Revolution (1983): 24-25. *JSTOR*. Web. 05 Oct. 2014.

In an interview with the grandson of Mohammad Mossadeq, the reason for the coup of 1953 in Iran were put into context explaining the world had been under immense pressure at the time, and that the weakness of the leadership in Russia after the death of Stalin had contributed to the West then being allowed to tinker in the business of the middle east. Heydeyat Matin-Daftari argues that Mossadeq only handled the situations poorly due to the lack of his resources.

McCurdy, Dave. "Glasnost for the CIA." *Foreign Affairs* 73.1 (1994): 125-40. *JSTOR*. Web. 5 Oct. 2014.

One theory for why the CIA did so many morally questionable things during the Cold War is that it was a secretive agency that only had to answer to one branch of government. In the 1970's, the US government tried to address this issue by creating the House Intelligence Committee so the CIA would have to answer to Congress also. Rep. Dave McCurdy served on this committee for ten years and in his writing about ways the CIA must change after the Cold War, it paints a picture of how the CIA was during the Cold War. It was an institution with the single goal of beating the Soviets and it was a very closed institution. McCurdy says that the CIA needs to bring in more outside experts because during the Cold War, the leaders were very closed and in need of academic and business experts as leaders.

McMahon, Robert J. "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalists: A Critique of the Revisionists." *Political Science Quarterly*, 1989. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

In this journal article, the leadership of Eisenhower was greatly criticized, saying he was a "lazy loof". This article obviously has a bias by saying he didn't contribute to help relations, but it also goes as far to say Eisenhower, even though highly regarded, was

actually worsening relations between the US and the Middle East. This article was a different point of view on the leadership or lack of it that went into the coup being successful, but in the long run, worsening relations.

MERIP. "A Celebration of Power." *Middle East Research and Information Project* (n.d.): 3-6+14. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

This source is a memoir written by a Peace Corps volunteer in Iran in 1971, 18 years after the coup that drove Mossadeq out of power. The author describes the dilapidated and oppressive state of the country in the midst of the Shah's rule. The article describes the violent oppression of free speech by SAVAK agents, the consolidation of power to the Shah, and the poor living conditions. This is particularly relevant because the land reform that consolidated power into the hands of the Shah was due to pressure from the United States, and the United States continued to give the Shah weapons and aid after the coup. As the CIA was the primary United States organization involved with the coup in Iran, this article is particularly relevant to the CIA because it shows the legacy of its actions. The legacy in Iran of what was most likely weak leadership in the CIA is an oppressive, dilapidated country. While no individual author is credited, the article was published by the Middle Eastern Research and Information Project, a respected independent research group, so it is a reliable source.

Mintz, Helen C. "Iran - MOSSADEQ AND OIL NATIONALIZATION." *Iran - MOSSADEQ AND OIL NATIONALIZATION*. Library of Congress, 1987. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

The Nationalization of Iranian oil was a huge part of why the US and British intervened, and within this article, the importance of the oil was heavily displayed, and the coup and many other events were blamed on the nationalization of Iran's oil. The oil was nationalized, and soon after, the British and the Americans became very angry. They viewed Mossadeq as a communist and wanted to get their hands on Iran's oil, they believed the only way they could achieve this was by kicking out Mossadeq and by putting in someone with ideas similar to theirs.

Moaddel, Mansoor. "Theories of Revolution." Introduction. *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution*. New York: Columbia UP, 1993. 1-23. *Google Books*. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

Moaddel, Middle Eastern studies professor at the University of Michigan, provides an excellent source that looks at the causes of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which was the ultimate result of the 1953 Coup. Published in 1993, it was before the CIA released most of

its resources surrounding the Coup, but sufficiently late enough so that enough information was available to form an opinion on the Coup, and enough time had elapsed after the Revolution to see most of its effects. It helps assemble more pieces to the legacy of the lack of leadership in the 1953 Coup, by exploring its effects.

Mokhtari, Fariborz. "Iran's 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue." *Middle East Journal* 62.3 (2008): 457-88. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This article discusses the situation in Iran before, during, and after the coup in 1953, as well as the British and American role. After Mossadeq came to power, the United States began to fear that Iran was falling behind the communist Iron Curtain. Secretary of States John Foster Dulles asked the CIA, led by his brother Allen Dulles, to formulate a coup for Mossadeq's removal from power. This article is particularly relevant because it discusses the American and CIA leadership behind the coup, as well as the immediate effects of the leadership's decisions in Iran. This was published in a respected and authoritative journal, and is therefore a trustworthy source.

Nalapat, M. D. "Wahhabism-Khomeinism Is The Enemy Of Islam." *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*. Radio Free Europe, 13 Mar. 2009. Web. 23 Oct. 2014.

Nalapat, director of an international relations department at an Indian University provides an in depth look at the ideals of Wahhabism and Khomeinism, the name given to the Islamic ideology that emerged from Khomeini's rise to, and time spent in power. Although the two groups do not like each other as one is a form of Sunni Islam while the other is Shi'a, in reality they both practice very similar things. This secondary source was helpful in that it helped connect some of the distant legacy events from the Iranian Coup. This is because it discusses ideals that emerged from one of the coups biggest effects.

Norouzi, Arash. "Eisenhower's Diary Confession of CIA Coup in Iran: Oct. 8, 1953." *Eisenhower's Diary Confession of CIA Coup in Iran: Oct. 8, 1953*. The Mossadegh Project, n.d. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

This is an article from the president of the Mossadegh Project, which by itself was not a very helpful article, but it included a one page excerpt from Eisenhower's diary three weeks after the Iranian Coup. In it he expresses his pride in and admiration of Kermit Roosevelt's leadership. He mentions that Roosevelt did an incredible job despite betrayals at the beginning of the coup, which contradicts other information we have found that shows that the issues at the beginning of the coup were mostly due to CIA oversight. This shows that

Eisenhower fully supported the leadership behind the coup and believed it to be a success that would have a positive legacy which the United States would benefit from.

Norouzi, Arash. "Eisenhower's Diary Confession of CIA Coup in Iran: Oct. 8, 1953."

Eisenhower's Diary Confession of CIA Coup in Iran: Oct. 8, 1953. The Mossadegh Project, 8 Oct. 2013. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

In this website dedicated to explaining the truth about who Mossadegh really was, the author puts a heavy blame on Eisenhower, who in a diary entry boasts about the great operation and an implied agent, (Kermit Roosevelt) who was successful and quick witted. The author states Eisenhower and many other U.S. officials were generally cocky, and felt as if they had done with best job with ease. When in reality the operation was very lackluster, and left Iran with a lot of problems for the future. The author argues the lack of true leadership lead to a legacy of confusion and conflict internal and external.

Operation Ajax. Perf. Kermit Roosevelt. IRTV, 1973. *Youtube.* Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

In this short clip from a documentary about the events of the coup, Kermit Roosevelt is interviewed about his role. He explicitly states the number one rule for Operation Ajax was to ensure that the U.S. was not shown in a bad light, that the U.S. did not want to be reflected badly upon if the operation failed. Roosevelt says this operation was very cheap and didn't require personnel, and was quite proud of that fact. On the contrary though, the narrator explains the small number of personnel was actually detrimental, that there was no strong leadership, that the coup led to more conflict in the future.

Risen, James. "Secrets of History the CIA in Iran." *New York Times* (2000): n. pag. *New York Times on the Web.* Web.

This thorough article was compiled from many primary sources and digested without much opinion added, simply the facts. It was interesting because, although it was not written at the time of the coup, it has the style of a newspaper article. It described the legacy of the coup in its relation to the overall rise of radical Islam in Iran. It helped me understand the important distinction between Sunni and Shia muslims, and also the pull of the Ayatollah in 1979. It made clear also that the coup was just another event in a long history in Iran and the instability and uncertainty of the Cold War which culminated in the 1979 revolution.

Risen, James. "Trying to Persuade a Reluctant Shah." *New York Times on the.* The Secrets of History, the CIA in Iran, 2000. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

This article reinforces other sources we have found which show Kermit Roosevelt to be an impulsive leader, and the CIA to have overlooked major issues when planning the coup. The coup was already in motion before Eisenhower signed off on it, and two weeks into the expensive propaganda campaign and protests which may have included CIA agents posing as communists and blowing up a building, the shah still had cold feet. He refused to sign the proper papers which would indite Mossadegh and it took two weeks for Roosevelt and the CIA to convince him. This shows the Shah's weak leadership, and the CIAs lack of planning in their leadership.

Roberts, G. "Moscow's Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Policy in Greece, Iran, and Turkey, 1943--8." *Journal of Contemporary History* 46.1 (2011): 58-81. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

This source provided a new viewpoint of Iran's role in the Cold War, by summarizing the Soviet thought process on Iran, among other states. Professor Roberts emphasizes that Iran was a secondary objective for the USSR, in contrast to more important goals in Eastern Europe. Overall, Roberts creates an important perspective of Iran's role relative to the larger Cold War.

Ruehsen, Moyara D. "Moyara Ruehsen Interview." Telephone interview. 12 Feb. 2015.

After reading an extremely helpful article about the planning and conduct of Operation AJAX written by Dr. Ruehsen, we felt compelled to set up an interview with her. We asked her a wide variety of questions, ranging from the British motives to John Foster Dulles's leadership. Despite having written the article over twenty years ago, Dr. Ruehsen still delivered in her responses, and provided lots of helpful information and analysis that validated our thesis. Overall, while it didn't introduce to us any new arguments or perspectives on the coup, this was a very insightful and helpful interview.

Ruehsen, Moyara D. "Operation 'Ajax' Revisited: Iran, 1953." *Middle Eastern Studies* 29.3 (1993): 467-86. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This article published in the journal Middle Eastern Studies was very helpful in providing context about the coup and shedding some light about who exactly was involved, and the extent to which they were. While Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, and Allen Dulles were all interested in the region due to the threat of communism, the article describes how the United States had to be swayed by the British to be involved in the coup. The article describes the poor leadership of the CIA in deciding to initiate Operation AJAX. Kermit Roosevelt, who was highly involved in the coup, said that, at the meeting where John Foster Dulles detailed his plans for the coup, many "if they had felt free or had the courage

to speak, would have opposed the undertaking." Much of the CIA's actions during the coup are detailed. Almost all CIA actions were covert and indirect. This suggests that the CIA's primary interest was making the best decision for Iran, it was simply to eliminate the existing problem as efficiently and quietly as possible. Many people in the organization did not like the idea of the coup, but went along with it because they saw no better option. This is an example of weak leadership by the CIA, and by installing the Shah into power, a negative and oppressive legacy in Iran would blossom from the lack of leadership.

Sanchez, Raf. "British Diplomats Tried to Suppress Details of MI6 Role in Iran Coup." *The Telegraph*. Telegraph Media Group, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. 05 Oct. 2014.

Sanchez, a national news reporter for The Telegraph, a British newspaper, discusses British involvement in the Iranian coup. Although this may not sound integral, he is one of the few sources that specifically discusses MI6's involvement in the Iranian Coup. Sanchez discusses their pursuit of keeping information about the Coup confidential, and active denial of their involvement, however it is worth noting that this article was published several weeks before the CIA declassified all documents related to the coup. This source pertains much more to leadership, as it briefly discusses MI6's role in assisting the CIA in the coup.

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent." *Political Science Quarterly* 115.3 (2000): 347-51. *JSTOR*. Web. 28 Sept. 2014.

This article discusses President Eisenhower's leadership structure during his time in the White House, and his use of the CIA, in contrast with his successor, John F. Kennedy. Eisenhower, reluctant to use conventional force, often turned to the CIA as a tool for international intervention; the coup in Iran was an example of this. During Eisenhower's presidency, the CIA's covert operations drew criticism from members of Eisenhower's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, some of which argued that the CIA's affairs were costly and not justifiable. The article is particularly relevant to the coup in Iran because it criticizes the American leadership and the CIA, saying that the "free-wheeling" CIA had a "destructive impact on the overall conduct of foreign affairs." This destructive impact was due in large part to a lack of strong leadership in the CIA. This article was found in a respected journal, and the factual information is reliable despite the author's bias.

Shoamanesh, Sam S. "Iran's George Washington: Remembering and Preserving the Legacy of 1953." *MIT International Review* (2009): n. pag. Web. 5 Oct. 2014.

This online journal provides a summary of the events and effects of the 1953 Iranian coup. Shoamanesh, an adviser at the International Criminal Court, states that the legacy of the coup created a blowback for US-Iran relations and directly impeded the development of Iranian political and nationalist development. Additionally, he claims that the coup created an excuse used by modern day Iranian leaders to avoid accountability for the myriad national issues, and influenced Iranian culture to develop a "mistrustful mind" mindset, preventing them from trusting outside forces and inhibiting Iranian development in international affairs.

Simkin, John. "Spartacus Educational." Spartacus Educational. N.p., Sept. 1997. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This article points out how the CIA, after trying out many coups, now held a sense of secrecy among the public. The amount of conspiracy theories began to rise, and as this article states, the assassination of JFK could have been a cover up by the government, and they began this style of lying once they began covert operations in other countries.

Smith, and Redfield. "Iran Coup D'etat 1953." *Utexas.edu*. University of Texas, n.d. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This broad article held some interesting insights into the 1953 coup. It addressed part of the legacy of the coup, that it planted anti-American sentiment. This would prove to be a very important issue leading to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Another thing this article addresses is the fact that many of the leaders involved on the Iranian side with the coup were, in fact, ex-nazis. This shows just how deep the fear of communism ran with American leaders, that they were willing to consort with ex-nazis in order to achieve the greater good.

Smith, Gaddis. "The Shadow of John Foster Dulles." *Foreign Affairs* 52.2 (1974): 403-08. *JSTOR*. Web. 27 Sept. 2014.

G.G. Smith, professor Emeritus of History at Yale, provides a description of John Dulles in the American political machine. Smith characterizes J. Dulles as a politically driven, hard-line, passionate leader in the American government whose views were extremely influential in American foreign relations. This journal, however, creates a connection between J. Dulles's leadership and many of the negative legacies of the Eisenhower administration, including the Iranian coup, citing the somewhat contradictory stances of Eisenhower and J. Dulles.

Smith. "Iran Coup D'etat 1953." University of Texas, n.d. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This broad article held some interesting insights into the 1953 coup. It addressed part of the legacy of the coup, that it planted anti-American sentiment. This would prove to be a very important issue leading to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Another thing this article addresses is the reasons for the United States to get involved in Iran in the first place. One shift in the United States policy occurred when Eisenhower came into office after Truman. Eisenhower's leadership was also reflected in the leaders he elected, such as the Dulles'.

Sonnenberg, Ben. "OSS into CIA." *Grand Street* 2.2 (1983): 177-86. *JSTOR*. JSTOR. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

Ben Sonnenberg's article provides an insightful look at the early roots of the CIA. Of particular interest is the article's description of Donovan's leadership and sentiments in the inception of the CIA. The article provides rich details about Donovan's motivations, struggles, conflicts, and values, and how his influence reflected itself in the CIA's modus operandi, and therefore its legacy as an organization. This is an authoritative secondary source, published in a well-known and respected journal.

Takeyh, Ray. "What really happened in Iran: the CIA, the ouster of Mosaddeq, and the restoration of the Shah Ray Takeyh." *Foreign Affairs*. July-Aug. 2014. *Global Issues in Context*. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This source goes into detail about the thought processes and what happened in the coup from a poor Iranian perspective. This talks about how the majority of common iranians were very aware of this coup, and did not want Mossadeq ousted. It talks about how Mossadeq was even used as a sign of peace and prosperity in many cases. The leadership of Zahedi was also addressed and how his rule was lackluster in substance to move Iran forward economically, politically, and socially. The iranians knew he was a figurehead, but he was still expected to help serve Iran and its interests.

Tehrani, Majid. Rev. of *Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954*, by Mary A. Heiss. *Iranian Studies* 3.3/4 (2000): 510-12. *JSTOR*. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.

Tehrani basically gives a summary of Heiss's book, comprehensively describing her argument save specific details. This review was helpful in that it points out the relationship

between radical Islam in the Middle East and globalism, and states that the crisis in the Middle East anticipated the larger global clash between the two systems.

"Text of Gorbachev's Farewell Address." *The New York Times*. *The New York Times*, 25 Dec. 1991. Web. 07 Jan. 2015.

Following the end of the Cold War, from a new lense we can see how the Iranian coup truly changed the course of our history starting with the cold war. Because of our impulsive leadership and our impulsive actions, the events in the Cold war could have been determined by the leadership of the coup and the actions. Because of the coup, which leaders believed to be a success at first was then seen as a failure, since it obviously created many new problems in the area. However it was too late, these destructive ideologies had already spilled into the planning of the Cold War.

"Wahhabism-Khomeinism Is The Enemy Of Islam." *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Oct. 2014.

This article gave me a more complex understanding of the views of some Iranians. Obviously, all Iranians are not radical muslims, but this article showed me an even more nuanced perspective on the culture of Islam in the post revolution world. It talked about how the militarized radical pan Arab Wahhabi brand propagated by Khomeini is very different from the more moderate spiritual brand of Islam, which is what "true" islam is. It says that part of the 1953 coup's legacy was, not only adding to the eventual result of the revolution, but also it embittered ties between the United States and Iran so much so that many Americans have a twisted view of Iranians. This source showed that the legacy of the coup is much more culturally complex than we initially thought.

Ward, Steven R. *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown UP, 2009. Print.

Reviewing this book was very beneficial to my research for this project. This was a very high quality source, with many other in-depth sources backing it up. This book was published by a university, so all the information in this book was very specific and authoritative. While only a few chapters were directly linked to our topic, each chapter held relevant specific information. From this source, I would say its strongest point is the quantity of information leading up to each event. This book was very heavy on explaining the leadership that was required for the coup and events leading up to it, but also explaining the legacy and aftermath.

Weiner, Tim. "C.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 28 May 1997. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This was a very interesting article that exposes how corrupt the CIA can be. It habitually "needs more space in its safes" and burns all of its documents. This is a direct legacy of the OSS and Wild Bill Donovan's ideals about a cowboy organization that collects intelligence, acts first and thinks second. This article was also interesting because US leaders did not officially acknowledge that America was behind the coup until 2012. It discusses the internal workings of the CIA and how it spread the coup as a success when it first happened, which created a legacy of the United States overthrowing governments all around the world once this precedent was set.

Weiner, Tim. "Part Two "A Strange Kind of Genius"" *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. New York: Doubleday, 2007. N. pag. Print.

It's no wonder that this book, based on 50,000 original documents and primary reporting, won the Pulitzer Prize. This book is organized by US president and how the CIA interacted with each administration. The chapters about Eisenhower were helpful in understanding how the CIA manipulated and whitewashed information in order to preserve a certain public image and to carry out dubious operations. This book also has an informative chapter on the Iranian coup and why it was the CIA's only successful coup.

Wilber, Donald Newton. "VII. Apparent Failure." *Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953*. Washington, D.C.?: Central Intelligence Agency, Clandestine Service, 1969. 44-64. Print.

In the newly declassified documents explaining the entire situation, in the chapter: APPARENT FAILURE, Donald Wilber explains how at first, during the night when the military was supposed to be set up, bureaucratic failures led to little to none of the necessary personnel showing up outside the compound. He explains that it was pandemonium and everyone involved was running around blindly without any clear direction. Overall, Donald shows the entire situation was dragged out longer than it had to be, all because of bureaucratic inconsistencies and the lack of a strong leader to guide the mission.

Wilbert, Caroline. "HowStuffWorks "How the CIA Works"" HowStuffWorks. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

This was a podcast we listened to, and it gave great insight on how the CIA operates, and

why there were weaknesses in the CIA's leadership when it was first created. It is stated that the amount of things that had been going on around the creation of the CIA developed a stressful environment for the workers, and the leaders became less efficient, rules were passed lazily, and the CIA was a mess for a while. This would help explain the lack of functionality at the time of the Iranian coup, when the leadership was a mess, and the following years were in the wake of a destructive beginning.

Weldin, Zeldia. "Turkey: Landmark Trial of 1980 Military Coup Leaders Begins." *Global Legal Monitor*. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 Jan. 2015.

This article explores the legacy of the Iranian coup in American Foreign policy and how it indirectly led to the 1980 coup in Turkey. It was not a straight cause and effect, rather a precedent sent by the Iranian coup which created a culture in which the Turkish coup could happen. This also gave us good historical context in understanding when events in the cold war took place and how the action moved around the world.

Wilford, Hugh. "I Knew That They Loved Me." *American History* 48.6 (2014): 50. *Academic OneFile*. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

One of the few sources that actually does so, "I Knew That They Loved Me" provides an in depth look at why Kermit Roosevelt, an active Arabist and anti-imperialist, would help cause a coup that pretty much destroyed everything he was working for. Written by Hugh Wilford, a professional historian, the secondary source is both authoritative, and still quite broad. It simultaneously narrates the events of the 1953 coup and intersperses it with a discussion of Roosevelt's motivations.

Woods, Jennifer. "The United States and the Overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953." (2008): n. pag. UMBC, 17 May 2008. Web. 21 Sept. 2014.

While not written by an acclaimed historian, this source also provides authoritative insight into the legacy shortly after the coup. Also potentially helpful are the sources provided by the author. Most are citations to books and scholarly journals, all of which look to be very useful sources.

Young, Michael. "Central Intelligence Arabists: How the CIA Tilted toward the Arabs in the 1950s and '60s." *Reason* Apr. 2014: 56. *Student Edition*. Web. 21 Sept. 2014. The view of the author essentially is that "spies cannot substitute for diplomats."

This source is a review of a book by historian, Hugh Wilford. It does a good job of

condensing one argument in the book, the role of "Arabists" in the CIA. It provides historical context to the Iranian coup regarding other ways the CIA was dismissive of other Middle Eastern leaders who did not share their hate of the Soviets the results such as Nasser accepting the Czech arms deal.

Zahrani, Mostafa T. "The Coup That Changed the Middle East: Mossadeq v. The CIA in Retrospect." *World Policy Journal* 19.2 (2002): 93-99. *JSTOR*. Web. 11 Sept. 2014.

In this article, Dr. Mostafa T. Zahrani, former Iranian diplomat at the Iran mission to the United Nations and the director general of the Iranian Institute of Political and International Studies, argues that the 1953 Coup in Iran directly led to the rise of radical Islam and the tense current Iranian-U.S. relations. While the article did go into some detail about the lack of CIA leadership behind the coup, it was primarily useful because of the explicit connections it made about the legacy of the coup. Zahrani states that the United States and the CIA's involvement in 1953 made Iranians extremely distrustful of Americans, which directly led to the 1979 hostage crisis. Also, Zahrani mentions that "Washington resisted joining with Britain to unseat Mossadeq" until the final months before the coup, and that United States motives are still generally unclear. This is extremely indicative of a glaring lack of leadership by the CIA and the other associated American organizations. Additionally, the radical Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as a "powerful dissenting voice" in the midst of the chaos of the coup, which led to the rise of radical Islam in Iran and anti-American sentiments. Zahrani explicitly ties the legacy of the emergence of radical Islam to the conditions caused by the lack of leadership in the coup of 1953. This is a direct connection between the lack of CIA leadership in the coup and a legacy of extremist Islam, which is exactly the evidence we were looking for to defend our thesis.

Zirinsky, Michael. Rev. of Mohammed Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, by Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne. *Iranian Studies* 39.39 (2006): 150-54. *JSTOR*. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.

Zirinsky highlights in his review of Byrne and Gasiorowski's book the moral hypocrisy that was apparent within the United States government when they overthrew Mohammed Mossadeq, a democratically elected leader and supporter of liberal values. Perhaps most important was the description of Byrne and Gasiorowski's apparent perspectives of the different parties involved in the coup, which are decidedly critical.